Open Response to the Open Letter entitled “Against the Weaponization of Anti-semitism in Finnish Academia: An Open Letter to Åbo Akademi, University of Helsinki, and The Kone Foundation”

On 28 March 2025, a personal friend of mine drew my attention to a so-called “Open Letter” entitled “Against the Weaponization of Anti-semitism (sic!) in Finnish Academia: An Open Letter to Åbo Akademi, University of Helsinki, and The Kone Foundation.”  Not having officially been sent this letter, it came to me as somewhat of a surprise. Clearly, it had taken the authors of the letter quite some time to formulate their concerns about not only the conference “Dialogue on Antisemitism: A Path Towards Understanding and Action” that was held between 29–30 January at Åbo Akademi University, but also about the academic and ethical conduct of me and my colleagues. Having carefully read the Open Letter, I understood that the undersigned have several misconceptions and misunderstandings about a number of matters that call for an open response on my own part. I would like to point out that this response is not the official institutional response of any organization or institution mentioned in the Open Letter, but a response of my own,* as the PI and responsible person of the Antisemitism Undermining Democracy (AUD) project.

To begin with, it is important to clarify a fundamental point that has been consistently communicated in the AUD research project’s public presentations, publications, and the original research plan submitted to the Kone Foundation in autumn 2022: the project does not, and never has, applied any preconceived definition of antisemitism. This includes commonly referenced frameworks such as the non-legally binding International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism (IHRA Definition), or the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA). This approach was intentional and is grounded in two essential reasons. First, the core aim of the project is to explore how antisemitism is understood and experienced by the local Jewish minority in Finland, at a specific historical and cultural moment, that is, at the time of the inquiry. Second, many existing definitions are themselves highly politicized, as the recent Open Letter’s selective language and framing demonstrate. The letter itself is an example of how quickly definitional choices become contested territory. The letter also fails to mention that the IHRA Definition together with the criticism it receives, is the most widely recognized (i.e., by Finland and the EU) and accepted tool that was developed by various international experts.

That said, while no single definition was adopted or applied by the Project Team, the members of the project have, of course, drawn on various scholarly contributions that provide critical theoretical and historical context in the study and the understanding of contemporary antisemitism. This is essential when approaching the topic with the necessary scholarly rigor and analytical depth, whilst studying the actual experiences and perceptions of the individuals who are the subjects of the inquiry. As such, definitions and notions of e.g., Helen Fein, who analyzed antisemitism as a product of sociopolitical conditions and collective identity dynamics, Gavin I. Langmuir, who differentiated between realistic and chimeric prejudice, as well as the work of David Nirenberg, who argues that antisemitism is fundamental in the Western way of thinking – to name a few – have been particularly useful in conceptualizing the research data collected within this study. 

Equally central to the project has been its participatory and ethically grounded approach. Jewish communities and organizations in Finland have been consulted at the beginning of the research project, for example at Limud Helsinki, in January 2023, where an open session on antisemitism was held, inquiring about what are the participants’ perceptions of the biggest issues when it comes to antisemitism in Finland. During the data collection of the interview research, calls for participation were distributed through various channels of the organized Jewish communities and organizations. In addition, various Jewish groups were reached out to, inviting them to take part in the qualitative interview process. To date, the research team has presented preliminary findings at several academic conferences and has multiple articles under review in various academic journals and edited volumes.

As I – and numerous scholars of antisemitism – have previously noted, antisemitism differs from other forms of racism most notably in its reliance on conspiratorial thinking, and through the simple fact that it has represented itself in various ways throughout two millennia. At the heart of antisemitic ideology lies the belief that Jews (and those identified as Jewish) possess a hidden, intangible form of global power – a force that not only dominates but supposedly explains the political, financial, and social systems – and, according to Karl Popper when he coined and explained the term “conspiracy theory of society” also big catastrophes, like war – of the world. These ideas may attach themselves to Jews as individuals or communities, to Zionism as an ideology, or to the State of Israel as a geopolitical entity. Regardless of the form, the logic remains conspiratorial, resilient, and deeply damaging for its victims.

This is precisely why Zionism as a concept must be treated with scholarly care. The open letter defines Zionism in a narrow and polemical way – as “an ideology that has resulted in the mass displacement and continued ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.” While it is both necessary and legitimate to criticize policies and historical processes that have caused harm, such a definition erases the wide diversity of Zionist thought and its history. Zionism has existed as a religious, cultural, political, and even anti-statist movement. For many Jews across generations and geographies, Zionism has represented a response to two millennia of antisemitism, repeated persecution including pogroms, expulsions from essentially all continents around the globe, and ultimately, the Holocaust. Undeniably, anti-Zionism can and have taken up different forms as well. It is noteworthy to mention, that the first form of anti-Zionism was fully internal to the Jewish world, and some definitions, including religious anti-Zionism, survived through modern times.

It is, however, also important to point out that anti-Zionism has historically served as a vehicle for antisemitism. For example, it has given a cover to antisemitic ideas and antisemitic discrimination, hate crimes and persecution, particularly in totalitarian regimes. In the Soviet Union, “anti-Zionism” became a state-sponsored euphemism for antisemitism, justifying purges, blacklisting, discrimination, and suppression of Jewish identity. Perhaps most infamously, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion – a fabricated document used to incite violence against Jews – presented Zionism as a cover for an eternal Jewish plot to dominate the world. In 1968, there was a mass emigration of the remaining Polish Jewish citizens from Poland, as a result of an antisemitic expulsion that was “branded” as anti-Zionist. These histories remind us that while anti-Zionism is not inherently antisemitic, it has often been mobilized in antisemitic ways – a nuance that must be maintained in honest discourse.

It is also important to know what previous inquiries have shown repeatedly: attitudes towards Israel and its supporters predict attitudes towards Jews qua Jews (and vice versa); negative attitudes towards Jews are elevated within certain ethnic, religious and political minority groups; antisemitic incidents tend to spike whenever Israel is involved in a conflict; and of course, attitudes towards Jews vary across national borders – to name a few scientific facts.

In the Finnish context, as a recent report published by the Ministry of Justice and the Human Rights Centre proves, those responding to the survey inquiring about perceptions and experiences of antisemitism and discrimination against Jews in Finland (approximately 17-22 per cent of Finland’s Jewish population) do not automatically equate criticism towards Israel with antisemitism. Nevertheless, they do regard certain forms of criticism (incl. the boycotts, holding Jewish citizens of Finland responsible for the actions of the State of Israel) as antisemitic. According to forty-two semi-structured individual interviews conducted with a diverse set of Jewish individuals in Finland within the AUD project (including members of the official Jewish congregations, non-affiliated Jews, Askhenazi Jews, Mizrachi Jews, Sephardi Jews, Finnish citizens, and other nationals, also representing a wide range of identities), informants by and large identified themselves as Zionists and defined Zionism as the “right of Jewish people to self-determination” or “the right of the State of Israel to exist.” Several of them reflected on antisemitism on the contemporary political left, as well as on the contemporary extreme right, which seem to be united in their hatred towards the State of Israel, as the most pressing issue they have experienced at the time of the inquiry. A number of them also reflected on the problematic nature of a particular forms of antisemitic Zionism, that is, a form of Christian Zionism that very often view Jews via seemingly positive but still stereotypical ideas, or via repeating antisemitic elements in certain theological narratives.

None of them expressed that criticizing the Israeli government would be inherently antisemitic. Nevertheless, most of them articulated their concerns about how such criticisms have been one-sided and have not reflected on the historical and the social realities of e.g., the ongoing war. They also addressed the issue that such criticism can and often does take up antisemitic forms. At the same time, they did not downplay the issue of far-right antisemitism and antisemitism coming from certain minority communities.

It is in this complex and historically loaded context that the invitation of one of the keynote speakers, Izabella Tabarovsky to the above-mentioned conference – which initiated the Open Letter – must be understood. The speaker was selected not only on the basis her affiliation with relevant institutions in the study of contemporary antisemitism, such as the London Center for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism or the Elizabeth and Tony Comper Center for the Study of Antisemitism and Racism, but also due to her personal experience as born in the Soviet Union, which speaks directly to the concerns the informants of the interviews discussed. In addition to her engagement with relevant institutions, the perspective from her lived experiences adds a human dimension to the otherwise somewhat abstract discussions on Soviet anti-Zionist antisemitism. To imply, as the letter does, that her invitation was unethical, is both factually incorrect and ethically problematic. In truth, her presence reflected the project’s commitment to representing those who are directly impacted by the topic at hand.

The open letter suggests that the conference “amplifies racist discourses by giving them academic legitimacy.” Yet this characterization misrepresents both the factual content and the intent of the event. The conference included sessions on far-right antisemitism, Holocaust memory and education, antisemitism in leftist discourse, and various forms of contemporary discrimination. The fact that the antisemitism on the left was included in these discussions does not reflect political bias, but the empirical reality that this is currently one of the most frequently reported sources of antisemitic incidents, according to surveys of Jewish communities across Europe.

Contrary to what the letter implies, the conference also hosted critical and open discussions on competing definitions of antisemitism, including the IHRA Definition, the JDA, and others. These were not merely referenced but actively debated, with scholars reflecting on their limitations, political implications and their applicability in scientific inquiry. No single definition was imposed or elevated as exclusive. Instead, participants engaged in a serious intellectual exchange on how antisemitism can and should be studied. It was also discussed how the applied definition is not particularly relevant when the real-life effect of the current situation is, that Jewish communities all over the globe suffer from a surge of antisemitism. The discussions also included the risks involved when Zionism is defined on behalf of Jews by others, thereby eroding Jewish agency and right to self-definition.

It is also worth noting that some of the accounts and groups listed as signatories of the Open Letter are anonymous. While anonymity may be necessary in specific contexts, in this case it undermines the transparency required for genuine and open academic exchange, especially when making serious accusations and insinuations against researchers and institutions – which might cause them reputational damage or harm. What is even more troubling is the fact that many – if not most – of those criticizing the conference did not attend, nor did they seek to engage with the organizers – that is, the Project Team – either prior to or after the event. Yet, they seem to be rather convinced that the event was not only ethically flawed but also politically motivated.

The Open Letter stated that the invitation of Tabarovsky “…shaped the conference as a whole and influenced the roster of presenters and speakers in attendance.” In academic life, disagreement and criticism are essential. Both, however, require engagement, familiarity with the material and the subject and the field, and willingness to enter a scientifically informed dialogue or a possible academic debate. Without these, the critique loses its rigor and becomes mere posture. This, perhaps, brings us to the core principle of academic inquiry: academic freedom.

Academic freedom does not mean that different viewpoints are beyond critique or discussion. What it means is that scholars must be not only free to but also encouraged to explore and discuss difficult questions and invite diverse perspectives. This, however, is not possible when one accuses other scholars preemptively of misconduct, or subject them to campaign-style delegitimization, without first-hand experience of the event they criticize, and without engaging with the professional viewpoints of the organizers as well as the presenters at the conference – including the bases of their research. Academic freedom protects critical scholarship, but it also demands ethical responsibility, as well as openness to converse and debate.

Finally, let me emphasize that we are in full agreement with the necessity of discussing racism, antisemitism, islamophobia, homophobia, and all other forms of structural and cultural prejudice and discrimination in our societies. These discussions must be ongoing and inclusive, but also evidence-based. This is what makes the recent dynamics of applying selective “scrutiny” to some scholars of prejudice and discrimination particularly problematic in current discussions. This leads to some being accused of “complicity” whilst others, even when espousing undeniably harmful and unscientific views, such as referring to the “Jewish lobby” and engaging in Holocaust distortion, e.g., when referring to the “Holocaust story” – as a recent example at the University of Helsinki showed – are left unchallenged, for example, by those who signed the Open Letter. This failure to interrogate viewpoints with an urgency even when the reasons for it are rather obvious reveals the inconsistency that undermines the credibility of those who claim to stand against all forms of oppression.

Therefore, I encourage those who signed the letter to reach out for open discussion or public debate, as such spaces are necessary. The conference was intended precisely as such a space – a forum for critical, complex, and often uncomfortable conversations. Those who disagreed with certain positions, approaches, or perspectives had the possibility of joining and showing their disagreements, opening the debates to new perspectives. This is the means through which one can progress academic and societal knowledge. Let us work toward advancing such knowledge, intellectual integrity, respectful engagement, and shared accountability – not anonymously and solely online, but face to face – transparently and outside of convenient echo-chambers.

04.04.2025, Helsinki

The Project Team was in agreement concerning the content of this Open Letter.

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